She recently published an opinion article that first appeared in the ON POLICY on 08 November 2024.
Coined by Alfreda T. Mahan, Sea Power refers to the power exercised by states through their capacity to use the sea for military and civilian purposes (1). The idea is premised on the argument that states can maximize their power through maritime security. The definition is geopolitical since state security and trade can be enhanced through this notion. Several states, such as the USA, China, and India, have established their preponderance through naval strategies (2). Sea Power chiefly depends on the country’s geographical position, national character, and extent of territory, to name a few (3). Though the argument mainly rests on the discourse of maritime security and naval strategies, how states use sea power does elucidate their national interests at an international level. Several International Relations theories can aid our understanding of the interplay between sea power and international relations. In this piece, one discusses how the BRICS expansion and their multilateral order implicitly conform to the principle of sea power and the implications thereof for the international community.
The BRICS expansion
BRICS+ is an intergovernmental group of states with a common goal of reforming the unipolar system into a more multilateral world order (5, 6). The BRICS+ includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, United Arab Emirates, Iran and Saudi Arabia (7). The composition and geographical setting of the BRICS+ alliance have always muddled scholars of international relations as to what common thread bounds the group together. The 15th BRICS summit saw a new frontier of expansion that echoed several new possibilities, advantages, geopolitical risks, and elucidations. As such, the highly renowned multilateral ambitions of the BRICS+ bloc and its recent expansion have been subject to global scrutiny in different parts of the world. The BRICS is set to formally inaugurate its new members, namely Ethiopia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, in the 2024 BRICS+ summit to be held in Russia. When probed, the bloc posited that their energy ambitions underpin their choice of admittance.
The BRICS is set to alter the current world order in numerous ways that can counter or even foresee an alternative world order against the Western hegemonic unipolar system (8, 9). Nonetheless, the geographic setting of the accepted new members against the applied members gives reason to believe that the BRICS+ bloc has ambitions to assert its influence on a global scale through the notion of Sea Power. When closely reading into the geography of the admitted members, one can deduce that two of its accepted members have some form of influence in the Red Sea, a strategic trade route for Europe into the African markets.
Geopolitics of the Red Sea
Amongst others, Egypt and Saudi Arabia control the Red Sea and are newly admitted members of the BRICS+. For a considerable period, the maritime politics of the Red Sea have been characterized by geopolitical tension (10). This is an interesting case since the control of the Red Sea connotes power within the political remits (11). In this context, control refers to the states with access to the route and military bases as a way of asserting dominance (12). The significance of the Red Sea lies in its facilitation of more than 10% of global trade between enormous economies such as the European region, North Africa, and the Asian region (13). The heavy dependence of some economies on the Red Sea has deemed it a ‘vital artery for the world economy’ (14). The cruciality of the Red Sea also stems from geographical reasons. By using the Red Sea, trade between European countries, Asian countries, and Australia cut down on the long detour around Africa for trade purposes (15).
Moreover, the route can only be accessed through two choke points: the Suez Canal from the north and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait from the south (16). It is worth mentioning that several superpowers own military bases in the Red Sea region, including the US, France, Japan, China, the UAE, and Turkey. Still, the reasons for their presence vary and are informed by their interests (17). Considering the ideological differences of the listed countries, their co-existence within a common region heightens the presence of a security dilemma and global instability in the area. The latter reveals how the Red Sea is a highly contested region amongst different actors. Thus, it can be predicted that the presence and growing influence of the BRICS+ agenda in the area may not be harnessed; the geopolitical tension within the region is anticipated to intensify.
On the other hand, Ethiopia has been gunning for control over the Red Sea, which it claims it has a right to access (18). This was the case until 1993, after the Eritrean secession. Ethiopia’s ambitions to access the Red Sea have sparked geopolitical tension. For Ethiopia, access to the Red Sea promotes the country’s trade capabilities but also aids in minimizing dependency on other states for maritime transit (20). Furthermore, Ethiopia’s plan to access the Red Sea through Somaliland is a significant risk that can reignite past border disputes with Eritrea and Somalia (21). These developments threaten the security and stability of the East African region.
Nevertheless, Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions also affect the BRICS+ proliferation and agenda. Suppose Ethiopia succeeds in its Red Sea access endeavour. In that case, it will reinforce and strengthen the bloc’s Sea Power agenda in the Red Sea region since three members can influence it.
What does this mean for the BRICS+ alliance?
The recent expansion does concur with the discourse of Sea Power, as the BRICS+ bloc aims to accentuate its multilateral order and multipolarity principle. When comparing the countries that applied for BRICS membership to the ones that have been accepted and admitted as BRICS+ members from a geographical perspective, it suffices to argue that the BRICS has chiefly prioritized and considered applications of states that exhibit Sea Power, particularly around the Red Sea. This means that the BRICS alliance has expanded its influence and agenda through concentration on the Red Sea. These developments are anticipated to affect the region’s geopolitics, global trade, maritime security, and the intergovernmental group. The concentration of the BRICS within the Red Sea has the potential to spark maritime and naval security dilemmas at a global level since several superpowers own military bases within the region to protect their economic and security interests, inviting further instability within the area (22). The trajectory may concur with the notion of a Thucydides trap sparked by ideological differences that co-exist within a shared political ecosystem. Subsequently, the BRICS order could alter trade agreements between regions that rely on that route for their trade. The latter refers to the possibilities of trade policy within the Red Sea, which may be influenced by certain ideologies that counter existing trade relations. However, the expansion also construes challenges, such as the dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. These disputes consequently undermine the multilateral agenda of the BRICS due to the instability and lack of collaboration within the intergovernmental group (23).
While the BRICS expansion can be examined and comprehended in numerous ways, it remains a prominent actor in shifting global dynamics. Thus, it is imperative to gauge the efforts and influence of the group in the Red Sea region simultaneously; it becomes instrumental in examining their efforts within the region through their multipolarity argument. This can aid our predictive arguments on the future of BRICS+. While geopolitical tension remains at its highest, the expansion can trigger a Thucydides trap of a multiverse war or a global Cold War series of ideological differences.
*The views expressed in this article are that of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect that of the University of Johannesburg.
