Bhaso Ndzendze is an associate professor of politics and international relations at the University of Johannesburg.

He recently published an opinion article that first appeared in the Daily Maverick on 24 February 2025

South Africa finds itself in the crosshairs of changing global dynamics which are heightening its insecurity. However, its military spending has been diminishing.

In an unprecedented move, Minister of Finance Enoch Godongwana had to postpone his Budget speech, originally scheduled for 19 February. The cause was disagreement over a value added tax (VAT) hike which might see the rate move from 15% to 17%.

There have been many views aired on where alternative sources of revenue could come from. One of these has been cutting the defence budget. This is wrong for many reasons.

First, the country can scarcely afford to let its guard down, which is what a decrease in military spending would amount to.

Second, government spending on the military has already been dwindling and is not keeping pace with the country’s security needs and the changing nature of the threats which confront it.

And third, it is time to revisit the national defence policy, a process which requires more, not less, spending on the military.

Not letting our guard down

Barely a month ago, South Africa was in a showdown which demonstrated the country’s diminishing status as a regional power when 14 of our soldiers lost their lives in presently unclear circumstances.

But that was not the show of decline. Rather it was what followed next – when the president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, engaged in a public escalation on social media against his South African counterpart, Cyril Ramaphosa.

That any considerably smaller nation across the spectrum – economy, population, landmass, and industrially – should have the temerity to threaten South Africa showed the lessened esteem now accorded to Pretoria by the rest of the outside world. Appropriately allocated and efficiently spent resources would have ensured that the country has respected armed forces across the region and continent, especially on training, intelligence, equipment, reconnaissance capabilities and technologies.

The rest of the world, however, is aware that the state of the SANDF is not at par with the global role South Africa wishes to play. Indeed, Kagame’s tweet was not the first time that a theoretically much smaller force than South Africa has threatened Pretoria with retaliation should it intervene in one of the conflicts to which it is party.

In 2020, the Islamic State terrorists in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province declared that they would open a theatre of conflict within the borders of South Africa if the country intervened in the ongoing insurgency in that northern province.

Now more than ever, the Republic of South Africa finds itself in the crosshairs of changing global dynamics which are heightening its insecurity. However, its military spending has been diminishing.

An already declining figure

In 2001, average global military spending as a percentage of general government expenditure stood at 6.7% and continuously grew until it peaked at 7% in 2006. It went on a nearly uninterrupted decline until 2021, when it started growing again. Currently it sits at 6.7%.

In turn, South Africa’s military spending opened the 21st century at 5.5%, peaked in 2002 at 6.2% and has had a virtually uninterrupted decline. The 2021 global turning point on military expenditure has had no apparent effect on South Africa, which spent only 2.2% on defence in the most recent year with available data.

South Africa is therefore behind the global average by a gap of 5.5%. Regionally, it is outspent by the likes of Namibia (7.47%) and Botswana (7.83%).

This is not to conflate high military spending with operational or strategic success. For example, Africa’s top spender is Somalia, at 19.8% of total expenditure going to the military in 2023. However, Mogadishu needs to have a higher-than-average military budget if it hopes to reassert itself successfully in its uniquely existential battle against terrorism.

The same holds for South Africa in terms of keeping external threats at bay and South Africans free from fear, which should be the aim of national defence policy as set out in s198(a) of the Constitution.

In other words, not all states which spend highly on their military are guaranteed operational success, but all states which enjoy operational success are those that spend more than a modest amount on their defence. The country may also benefit from rethinking the role of defence in civilian life and the broader economy.

Time to change position on security doctrine

South Africa’s military doctrine is contained in the three-decade-old 1996 White Paper on Defence. Written in the shadow of apartheid and in service of a profoundly human-centred and democratic Constitution, the document sets out a radical rethinking of the meaning of national defence.

The document is akin to much of the post-Cold War literature of the time, akin to Francis Fukuyama’s End of History. In its assessment of the global context, for example, it asserts that relations with neighbouring countries have changed from suspicion and animosity to friendship and cooperation.

Further down, it commits to a reduction of South Africa’s military, stating that “reductions in South Africa’s force levels and weapons holdings might stimulate a broader process of disarmament in southern Africa”, presenting the (international) liberal view that doing so “would increase resources for development and thereby promote stability”.

This is the so-called peace dividend – the idea that the reduction in military spending can yield developmental benefits in other domains, particularly the economy and social welfare. This was doubled-down on in the 2015 Defence Review mandated by the minister at the time, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula.

The peace dividend is not automatic, however. Instead, the characterisation of the Department of Defence as a developmental player has stripped away clarity on the mandate of the SANDF and created overlaps with other departments, thereby contributing to the duplication of roles among ministries which reduces direct accountability.

Whatever developmental benefits are derived from the armed forces should be byproducts of its efficiency.

Concerningly, if the 2024 manifestos are anything to go by, none of the major parties in the ruling coalition has any serious consideration of the role of the military as a matter of policy. It thus risks being a casualty of the ongoing bargaining. That would be tragic.

Now more than at any point in its democratic era, South Africa should speak – whether softly or loudly – with the backing of a big stick. In order to not be bullied, South Africa must have a deterrent.

*The views expressed in this article are that of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect that of the University of Johannesburg.